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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY MARTIN REDD, SHEILA M. ) 
REDD, his wife; STERLING HARDSON) 
REDD, JILL D. REDD, his wife; ) 
PAUL DUTSON and DONNA DUTSON, ) 
his wife, ) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
Case No. ~I 1..:2 :~> J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Respondent, pursuant to "due on sale" provisions 
contained in a trust deed, but not in the promissory note it-
self, commenced non-judicial trust deed foreclosure proceed-
ings against Appellants' real properties solely as a result of 
the contract sale of those properties by the Appellants who 
were the original borrowers. The purpose of the foreclosure 
proceedings was to permit the Respondent to obtain an increase 
in the interest rate payable under the trust deed note, as 
well as to obtain payment of prepayment or refinance charges. 
The Appellants, as a result, commenced this action for a 
declaratory judgment to determine that the Respondent had no 
right to foreclose its trust deed, for injunctive relief 
against those administrative foreclosure proceedings, and for 
damages. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss alleging 
that the Appellants' complaint failed to state a cause of 
action against the Respondent. 
- 1 -
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court of the State of Utah, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding, after hearing arguments 
on Appellants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and after treating the Respon-
dent's motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment, granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of the Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants respectfully request that the Summary 
Judgment of the Third District Court be reversed and that this 
matter be remanded for trial on the issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Preliminary Statement. 
The issues in this case involve consideration and 
application of language in mortgages and trust deeds commonly 
referred to as a "due on sale" clause, which purports to per-
mit a lender to accelerate the mortgage note to require imme-
diate payment of all remaining indebtedness upon the sale, 
transfer or further encumbrance by the borrower of any of the 
borrower's interest in real property securing the loan. At 
the present 
clauses are 
courts; are 
periodicals 
time, application and scope of "due 
being widely litigated in state and 
the subject of numerous commentaries 
as well as publications directed at 
on sale" 
federal 
in legal 
the real 
estate and mortgage loan markets; and are the subject of con-
cern by state and federal regulatory agencies. 
- 2 -
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The application and scope of "due on sale" clauses 
have a pervasive affect in both the real estate markets and 
the mortgage loan industries and, as an ultimate result, 
directly affect individual rights and ownership in real prop-
erty. Thus, applicability of "due on sale" clauses has a 
broad social and economic impact on the ownership and trans-
ferability of real property, not only in Utah but nationwide. 
The instant case is the result of a groundswell of 
current activity in Utah whereby many lenders have aggres-
sively attempted to enforce the "due on sale" clauses commonly 
contained in most mortgages and trust deeds. While these 
important issues have been litigated in other jurisdictions, 
the instant case involves legal and equitable issues of first 
impression in Utah, which transcend the specific disputes 
between the parties hereto. 
B. Facts of the Instant Case. 
On or about November 18, 1976, the Appellants exe-
cuted a Trust 
principal sum 
Deed Note in favor of 
of $108,000.00 (R.33), 
the Respondent in 
and all payments 
the 
to 
Respondent were current at the time the disputes, which are 
the subject of this action, arose (R.38, 40). This Trust Deed 
Note is secured by a Deed of Trust on a twenty-four (24) unit 
apartment building in Salt Lake County, Utah (R.22). The 
"boilerplate" language in the Trust Deed securing the obliga-
tion includes "due on sale" language purporting to permit the 
Respondent to accelerate the note and to require immediate 
payment of all remaining indebtedness, upon the sale, transfer 
- 3 -
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or encumbrance by the borrowers of any of their interest in 
the subject property. The applicable language is as follows: 
29. Trustor agrees to notify the Beneficiary in 
writing should said property or any interest therein 
be conveyed, transferred or assigned, whether by 
deed, contract of sale, lease with option to buy or 
otherwise, and whether or not the instrument of con-
veyance, transfer or assignment be recorded. Should 
said property or any interest therein be so conveyed, 
transferred or assigned, whether or not Trustor gives 
written notice thereof, all indebtedness secured 
hereby shall forthwith, without notice, become due 
and payable at the election of Beneficiary, and in 
addition there shall be due and payable to the Bene-
ficiary an amount equal to the prepayment fee due 
Beneficiary upon prepayment of the note according to 
the terms of the note and should Beneficiary not so 
elect and the person who acquires said property or 
any interest therein assumes the indebtedness evi-
denced by the note secured hereby, Trustor waives 
presentment, demand, protest and notice of nonpayment 
of said note, and consents to delays, changes in time 
of payment, and the amount of installments due under 
said note, and to the reduction or increase of the 
interest rate thereof. 
30. Should Trustor further encumber said prop-
erty, or any part thereof, or any interest therein, 
or agree so to do, without the written consent of 
Beneficiary being first obtained, Beneficiary shall 
have the right, at its option, to declare all sums 
secured hereby forthwith due and payable. Consent to 
one such encumbrance shall not be deemed to be a 
waiver of the right to require such consent to future 
or successive encumbrances. (Emphasis supplied) 
(R. 25). 
Concurrently with execution of the Trust Deed, the 
Appellants executed a separate document entitled "Acknowledge-
ment of Trust Deed Acceleration Clauses," making reference to 
the paragraph numbers containing above-quoted "due-on-sale" 
language (R.31), which the Respondent, apparently as a regular 
matter of practice, requires borrowers to execute. 
- 4 -
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While, the trust deed note does not contain any 
similar language, the note does contain the following language 
imposing substantial costs in the event Appellants elect to 
prepay or to accelerate the note: 
The privilege is hereby granted to prepay the 
amount due on this note, in whole or in part, on any 
interest paying date by paying to the holder hereof, 
a premium in an amount equal to six (6) months inter-
est on the then unpaid principal balance due here-
under (R.33). 
The remaining principal balance, at the time the dis-
pute arose was in excess of $104,000.00 (R.47); and interest on 
the note is 9-3/4% per annum (R.33). Under the terms of the 
note, therefore, the Appellants would have been required to pay 
a substantial penalty in excess of $5,000.00 to have the right 
to accelerate total payment. 
On or about September 25, 1979, the Appellants entered 
into a contract for the sale of the subject property to third 
parties, while the Appellants retain fee title to the property 
(R.3, 41, 111). Under the terms of the contract, the Appel-
lants continue to be obligors under the trust deed note, con-
tinue to make payments to the Respondent through an escrow 
account established for that purpose (R.38, 40), continue to 
receive payment for their equity in the property (R.41), and 
are required to convey title to the property only after full 
and timely payment by the purchasers of the purchase price 
(R. 41) . 
Subsequent to execution of this contract, the Appel-
lants have continued to pay to the Respondent all loan payments 
in a timely manner and the Respondent has not alleged any 
- 5 -
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default in payments (R.38, 39, 40, 42). The Respondent, never 
theless, 
due for 
has returned all tendered payments since the paymen· 
Apppellants hav' February 1980 (R.13, 38, 41) . The 
made a continued tender of payments, with those payments pre· 
sently being deposited in savings account number 01-177353-li 
with the Respondent, and all rights to that account have beer 
assigned to the Respondent (R.38, 40) 
Solely on the basis of the Appellants' contract for 
sale of the subject property, and the Appellants' refusal tr 
consent to the requested increase in the interest rate payablr 
to the Respondent, as well as additional financing charges, t~ 
Respondent, on March 9, 1980, recorded a Notice of Default co~ 
mencing non-judicial trust deed foreclosure proceedings on thr 
subject property pursuant to the "due on sale" clause (R.65), 
which the Respondent contends creates an automatic right in t~ 
Respondent to demand acceleration of the trust deed note, 
declaring the entire balance due and payable (R.13, 29, 45, 
46). The purpose of this attempted acceleration is to compe: 
the re-execution of the trust deed note at a substantialD 
higher rate of interest and the payment of additional ref inan· 
cing charges. 
The Appellants filed this action in response to thr 
foreclosure proceedings praying for 
interpret and determine the rights 
foreclosure of the subject property, 
a declaratory judgment t'. ' 
of the Respondent for 
for injunctive relief pre· 
eluding the foreclosure, and for damages for wrongful foreclo· 
sure (R. 2) • 
- 6 -
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Not only has the Respondent never made any allegations 
of any default in payments, the Respondent has not alleged the 
existence of any facts or circumstances which create the like-
lihood of any future default in payments, damage or potential 
damage to the properties securing the loan, nor any other 
default by the Appellants (R.39, 40, 41). The Respondent bases 
its demand for acceleration solely upon the contract sale of 
i1 the subject property (R.13) and the intention to require an 
increase in interest rate over and above the amount originally 
~ contracted for between the Appellants and the Respondent at the 
~ time the original trust deed note was negotiated and executed, 
~ together with other refinancing charges (R.29) 
h, Based upon these transactions and the documentation 
involved herein, the Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, without 
h1 hearing any other evidence (R.110), entered an Order of Summary 
e. Judgment (R.110) in favor of the Respondent holding that, in 
5. th is case, the "due on sale" clause is not an unreasonable 
e: restraint on alienation, is not contrary to public policy of 
.t Utah, and is a legal, valid and enforceable contract provision 
~· which does not work a penalty or forfeiture (R.113). The 
effect of this judgment is to permit continuation of the pend-
:~ ing non-judicial trust deed foreclosure, requiring acceleration 
t· of the entire remaining principal balance and the payment of 
additional fees. The Appellants urge that the effect of this 
:e· 
Lo· 
- 7 -
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judgment, also, is to establish a dangerous precedent, recog 
nizing the right of a lender automatically to require renegoti 
ation of interest rates, and to obtain the benefit of refinan 
cing charges, upon the contract sale or other transfer of ar 
interest in property, even though the promissory note i tsel: 
contains no language authorizing the acceleration and ever 
though substantial legal and equitable issues remain unconsid· 
ered by the Courts of Utah. 
ARGUMENT' I 
ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED 
OR APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
The issues raised in this case involve important and 
substantial questions of law and equity impacting on the real 
estate and lending businesses throughout the State of Utah, 
and involve transactions identical to numerous other common 
real property transactions in the State of Utah. The Appel-
lants contend tnat the issues raised in this case, being of 
substantial interest, concern and impact, require careful and 
thoughtful judicial consideration in order to lend clarity and 
guidance to the present uncertainty and concern. 
Despite these major and substantive issues of law 
and equity involved in this case, and the implications in-
valved for the mortgage loan and real estate markets and the 
transferability of real property by owners, the lower court in 
entering Summary Judgment held, as a matter of law, that there 
is no geniune issue as to any material fact in this matter 
precluding a determination in favor of the Respondent 
(R.113). The lower court, as a result, was in error, thus 
- 8 -
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establishing a wideranging precedent without the careful con-
sideration which these significant and complex issues demand. 
Clearly, entry of Summary Judgment is not appropriate 
unless there is no likelihood that any genuine issues of 
material facts may exist. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; In re Williams Estates, 10 U. 2d 83, 348 P. 2d 683 
(1960). Likewise, the substantial issues create significant 
justiciable issues. Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n of :.iinneapolis, 271 N.W. 2d 445 (Minn. 1978). 
The parties raised, in their respective affidavits 
and memoranda submitted to the District Court, substantive and 
complex issues involving the nature of the transactions 
between the parties, the nature of the mortgage and lending 
businesses, and complex economic assumptions involving the 
secondary mortgage market and its alleged affect upon the 
mortgage loan industry. Supporting the Respondent's motion 
were self-serving affidavits and arguments which the lower 
court obviously accepted on their face. This has precluded 
discovery, admission of relevant evidence, and findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to lend certainty and guidance as 
to the law applicable in the State of Utah. Notwithstanding 
the determination by the lower court, there are at least the 
following material issues of fact and law which the Appellants 
should have the right to present for determination in this 
case: 
- 9 -
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1. The "due on sale" lariguage, which is the 
core of the issues herein, purports to grant ari auto-
matic right to accelerate a loan in the event of a 
sale or transfer, but significantly grants the lender 
no specific right to increase interest rates, or to 
accelerate the loan to require an increase of inter-
est rates, and the accompanying refinancing charges, 
in the event of such a transfer. At best, this 
clause, standing alone, is ambiguous and misleading 
to the borrower. It is further ambiguous when com-
pared with the contradictory language of the trust 
deed note which exacts a substantial penalty in the 
event of early payoff (in this case, the orepayment 
penalty would be in excess of $5, 000. 00) The lower 
court's findings of fact, however, do not address 
this basic issue, i.e., the interpretation and scope 
of the note and trust deed language itself to deter-
mine the rights of the parties thereunder, although 
other courts have recognized the need first to exam-
ine the contract language. Silver v. Rochester Sav. 
Bank, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 945, 947-48 (1980); Nichols v. 
Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 
250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); Clark v. Lachemeier, 237 So.2d 
583 (Fla. 1970). 
- 10 -
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2. Equally important, no evidence was presented 
nor examined by the lower court relative to the sig-
nificant fact that the "due on sale" language is in-
cluded only in the documents providing security for 
the note, but not in the promissory note itself. No 
evidence was presented to the lower court as to 
whether, in this case, the language should, there-
fore, be construed solely for the purpose of protect-
ing the lender's security, and not as part of the 
agreement concerning interest rates. 
3. No evidence was presented to the lower court 
concerning the circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion of the subject documents in order to determine 
the respective intentions and understandings of the 
parties at the time of execution. 
4. The Respondent made numerous allegations and 
arguments regarding the requirement of a "due on 
sale" clause being necessary to preserve adequate 
secondary 
strongly 
mortgage 
disputed by 
market funding, 
the Appellants, 
conclusions 
and arguably 
without substance unless the Respondent can show evi-
dence of any adverse affect on lending practices in 
the states where the courts have rejected the Respon-
dent's arguments. No evidence was presented, nor 
examined, in the trial court, relative to that criti-
cal issue, al though the findings of fact accept the 
Respondent's position as true on its face. 
- 11 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. The Court heard no evidence concerning the 
nature or operation of the Respondent's practices, 
requirements and regulatory frameworks in the mort-
gage lending business nor, indeed, any other finan-
cial institution in the State of Utah or elsewhere. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the lower court apparently 
accepted, on their face, the Respondent's arguments 
as to the desirability of allowing mortgage lenders 
periodically to adjust portfolios to current market 
interest rates regardless of the specific interest 
rates previously negotiated. 
6. No finding has ever been made by the Court 
regarding any different application, or emphasis, if 
any, of "due on sale" clauses in "commercial" vs. 
"residential" transactions and settings, a distinc-
tion raised by the Resoondent before the lower court 
and obviously relied on by the lower court in its 
findings of fact (R.110). 
7. Despite findings of the trial court that the 
"due on sale" clause, as worded in this case and as 
treated in this case, is not against public policy 
(R.113), no evidence was presented nor findings made 
as to the public policy considerations which should 
be examined by the Courts in this state and elsewhere. 
- 12 -
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8. Despite the finding of the trial court that 
the transactions in this case did not constitute un-
reasonable restraints on alienation (R.113), no evi-
dence was presented as to whether or not such a "due 
on sale" clause in the first place constitutes a 
restraint on alienation and, if so, whether such a 
restraint is an unreasonable restraint. The treat-
ment and analysis of this issue has been a central 
point of departure in cases resulting in opposite 
holdings, ~ Occidential Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco 
Partnership, 293 N.W.2d 843 (Neb. 1980), Wellenkamp 
v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 
(1978) . 
9. without specific evidence or findings justi-
fying its conclusion, the lower court was in error in 
determining that the Respondent's actions did not 
constitute a penalty or forfeiture, but constituted 
valid transactions. 
10. The Court did not determine or examine 
whether, under the Court's equitable powers, the 
foreclosure herein, even if allowed, should have been 
treated as a mortgage foreclosure, allowing a redemp-
tion period, rather than as a non-judicial trust deed 
foreclosure allowing no redemption after the initial 
ninety (90) day i:ieriod, although the affect of 
Respondent's acceleration is to accelerate the total 
balance as a mortgage foreclosure action does. 
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11. No determination was made by the trial 
court as to the affect, from "due on sale" clauses, 
on mortgagors' anticipations and setting of rents, 
costs, charges, tax affects and other economic con-
siderations in property transactions nor the extent 
to which lenders are in the better position to antic-
ipate and protect themselves against future economic 
fluctuations. 
12. No evidence of any nature, other than bare 
assertions by the Respondent, was offered to the 
lower court to show that unenforceability of "due on 
sale" clauses would have a materially adverse affect 
upon lenders and upon the mortgage market in the 
State of Utah. 
13. No findings or determinations were made by 
the lower court as to whether a "due on sale" clause 
in a mortgage or trust deed is the appropriate or 
equitable vehicle to control interest rates and 
adjustments in the face of a changing economy. 
14. Issues were raised, but unresolved, in the 
lower court relative to the supposed federal preemp· 
tion of Utah real property law involving the "due on 
sale" clauses and the scope and nature of Sections 
7-7-5.1 and 7-13-14, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended (R.19, 58, 112, 113). ;~hile the Findings of 
Fact state that the Appellants "misanalyze the scoPe 
and nature of" those sections (R.113), the lower 
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court failed to state or clarify the applicability of 
those statutes. 
Given the fact that the issues in this case involve 
substantial and complex issues of law, equity, economics, 
lending practices, real estate ownership considerations, 
interpretation of commonly used mortgage and trust deed lan-
guage, and public policy considerations, the failure of the 
lower court to allow the Appellants to present evidence in-
volving these issues was clearly in error, and that court's 
judgment should be reversed and, at the very least, remanded 
for consideration of evidence to determine the interpretation 
and applicability of the language at issue in this case; the 
intentions of the parties at the time of execution of the loan 
documents; whether, even if applicable, the "due on sale" lan-
guage is a restraint on alienation and, if so, whether it is 
an unreasonable restraint; whether "due on sale" language is 
automatically enforceable absent a showing of jeopardy to the 
lender; whether automatic application of the "due on sale" 
language is contrary to public policy; whether the applicable 
language constitutes a penalty or forfeiture; and whether 
legal or equitable circumstances exist in this case requirinq 
separate treatment or application of the law. 
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ARGUMENT II 
THE "DUE ON SALE" LANGUAGE APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE 
DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY PERMIT THE INCREASE 
OF INTEREST RATE IN CONNECTION WITH A TRANSFER OR SALE OF 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
The lower court has made the determination that the 
language at issue in this case is enforceable under the cir-
cumstances of this case. Significantly, no substantive exami-
nation of the applicable language itself has been made by the 
Court. 
It is significant to note that the promissory note 
itself, the primary instrument setting forth the respective 
rights and obligations of the parties, not only makes no 
reference to the right of the Respondent to increase interest 
rates under any circumstances through acceleration of payment, 
but in fact contains language providing for a "premium" (or, 
as Appellants urge, a penalty) in the ev~nt of preoayment 
(R.33) I which language discourages acceleration by the 
borrower. If the Respondent's position is accepted, t~ 
Respondent, therefore, has the best of all worlds: the lender 
can, at its option accelerate the loan upon sale or transfer 
by the borrower of an interest in the property; but if the 
borrower desires to accelerate the loan, the borrower must pay 
a substantial penalty. 
The "due on sale" language relied upon by the Respon· 
dent is language contained solely within a document intendec 
to provide security for payment of the note, not in the noU 
itself. More critically, the language relied on in the trust 
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deed does not authorize acceleration for purposes of increas-
ing interest rates. The Appellants believe that the language 
itself is significant in that the parties, if the intention 
clearly to allow an increase in the interest rates or other 
alteration of the terms of the note, could easily have put 
that specific language in the note itself. Indeed, such spe-
cific language is not even included in the trust deed language 
at issue. Certainly, the reliance upon language in the secu-
rity agreement which does not specifically authorize the 
actions complained of is inappropriate. At the very least, 
the Courts should examine the intentions and understandings of 
the parties at the time the loan papers were executed. 
Courts have been divided on this issue, but decisions 
in other states have recognized problems when the language 
itself is imprecise. The New York Supreme Court, appellate 
division, cogently observed: 
stated: 
At best, such a clause in the mortgage, standing 
alone, is ambiguous and misleading to the mortgagor. 
The normal inference to be drawn from it is that the 
lender is concerned about the security of the mort-
gage upon the transfer of ownership of the property. 
To construe it as granting to the lender an unlimited 
right to decline to accept the grantee for any rea-
son, including the lender's refusal to consent to a 
change in the mortgage contract by increasing the 
rate of interest, is a giant step, which, as shown 
above, many states have, nevertheless, taken. Silver 
v. Rochester Sav. Bank, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 945, 947 (1980) 
See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan, supra; 
Clark V. Lachemeier, supra 
A student commentator, with simplicity and clarity 
:.Jo doubt an argument can be made that a risk 
from which the lender should be protected is rising 
interest rates. The point is, however, that history 
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and custom indicate that consent has never been 
denied unless the transferee or purchaser was a bad 
credit risk or a change in the possessory interest 
would endanger the security interest. Moreover, 
public policy has heretofore always preferred the 
free alienability of property over that of the free-
dom of contract. 
In circumspection, therefore, the enforcement of 
"due on sale" clauses should correspond with the 
expectations of the parties at the execution of the 
agreement. If the lender wants to extend control 
over the property so that the lending rate can be 
renegotiated, a clear statement of such intent should 
be evident. Otherwise, lenders should be held to 
traditional notions of what circumstances justify 
denial of consent, namely possession or assumption 
which jeopardizes the lender's security interest. 
(Footnotes omitted.), Note, "Mortgages - A Catalogue 
and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement 
of Modern Day 'Due-on-Sale' Clauses," 26 Ark.L.Rev. 
485 (1973). 
It is further significant that, where ambiguities 
exist in documents, the documents should be construed most 
strongly against the preparer of the documents (in this case, 
the Respondent) Smith v. Burton, 4 Utah 2d 61, 63 P.2d 806, 
807 (1955) . 
It is respectfully suggested that the interpretation 
from the ambiguous language in the security document, which is 
the subject hereof, allowing automatic increase in interest 
rates is "a giant step" which should not be allowed for the 
hidden purpose of raising interest rates, without the Appel· 
lants being afforded the opportunity of the Courts at least 
examining the circumstances involved and the intentions of the 
parties at the time the loan transactions were consummated. 
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ARGUMENT III 
UNDER UTAH LAW, A "DUE ON SALE" CLAUSE 
IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENFORCEABLE WITHOUT 
A SHOWING OF GOOD FAITH AND NECESSITY FOR 
PROTECTION OF THE LENDER 
Assuming, ad arguendo, that the Respondent overcomes 
problems with the ambiguous language itself, the Utah Supreme 
Court has never been squarely faced with the specific issue as 
to whetner a "due on sale" clause in a security document, 
which purportedly triggers acceleration of the loan, is auto-
matically enforceable upon any contract sale without the 
requirement that the lender, in good-faith, determines that 
the prospect of payment or value of the security is impaired. 
The issue of the enforceability of "due on sale" clauses as a 
result of the sale or intended sale of properties is a much-
litigated matter in the United States with the Courts being 
asked to resolve the conflict between contractual langauge, on 
one hand, and the common-law right to ownership and alienation 
of property, on the other hand. 
In the past several years the authorities have been 
divided between cases holding "due on sale" clauses automati-
cally enforceable, and cases holding them enforceable only 
upon the showing by the lender of some impairment or jeopardy 
to its security by virtue of the transfer. 
The Appellants contend that the Utah Supreme Court, 
in light of previous Utah cases, will and should follow the 
rationale of the cases holding that a lender must demonstrate 
that its legitimate interests are threatened because of a con-
tract sale hy the borrower to whom the loan in question was 
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originally made, and also that the lender's attempted actions 
are equitable, in order to justify acceleration of the loan. 
Under Utah law, the lender takes a mortgage (in this 
case, a Trust Deed) solely as security for payment of the debt: 
The main purpose of a mortgage is to ensure the 
payment of the debt for which it stands as security; 
and foreclosure_ is allowed when necessary to carry 
out that objective. The proceeding is one in 
equity in which principles of equity should ~ 
applied consistent with the above stated purpose; and 
neither the mortgage nor the foreclosure should be 
used as an instrument of oppression United 
States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976)-.~~ 
In State Bank of Lehi v. Woosley, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1977) , the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of foreclo-
sure, but only after the findings by the trial court showing 
that the debtors were $161,000.00 in default, were insolvent, 
and were unable to pay their debts; the debtors failed to care 
properly for the collateral; and a substantial amount of col-
lateral was missing. Thus, the Court held that the debtors 
had not sustained their burden of proving lack of good faitr 
on the lender's part. The Court, in that case, significantl) 
reiterated the governing principal that acceleration and fore· 
closure are "harsh" remedies 565 P.2d at 418. The inescapabl• 
conclusion from a reading of this case, and the aut'ior i tie! 
cited by the Court in this case, is that under Utah law n1 
acceleration or foreclosure can equitably be justified in t~ 
absence of the lender's good faith concerns as to its ow1 
jeopardy. The Appellants herein allege that the Respondent' 
actions are in violation of that equitable and reasonabl' 
standard. 
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A number of the courts, holding that a "due on sale" 
clause is not automatically enforceable, have based their 
decision in large ::iart upon the recognition that the "due on 
sale" clause, in a very real sense, constitutes a restraint on 
alienation which often is an unreasonable restaint, ~ 
Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra; Wellenkamp 
v. Bank of America, supra; Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978): Sanders 
v. Hicks, 317 So.2d 61 (Miss. 1975); Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 526 P.2d 1169 (1974); Tucker 
v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan n.ss'n, 481 S.W. 2d 725 (Ar1<. 1972). 
As the court in Tucker v. Lassen, supra, examining a 
"due on sale" clause in the context of a contract sale by the 
borrower stated: 
we conclude that the automatic enforcement of a 
"due-on" clause in instances where the trustor-
obligor has entered into an installment land contract 
to sell the secured property would result in a 
restraint on alienation of very considerable propor-
tions. In fact it is clear that such enforcement 
would operate to virtually eliminate alienation by 
installment land contract in all situations where the 
property to be conveyed was subject to a deed of 
trust and the obligation under the note remained sub-
stantial. From this standpoint the contrast between 
an outright sale and an executory sale by installment 
land contract is striking. In the former, as we 
pointed out in LaSala, the automatic application of 
the "due-on" clause results in little if any 
restraint on alienation because the terms of the 
second sale usually provide for full payment of the 
prior trust deed. In other words, the trustor-vendor 
normally receives enough money through the financing 
of the second sale to pay off his note, and he is 
normally required to do so. Little if any restraint 
on alienation results through enforcement of the pro-
vision . 
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In the case of the installment land contract, 
however, the matter is otherwise. The truster -vendor 
normally receives a relatively small down ?ayment 
upon execution of the contract, the remainder of the 
purchase pr ice to be paid through monthly install-
ments. This down payment, like the proceeds of the 
junior encumbrance involved in LaSala, "does not 
often provide the borrower with the means to dis-
charge the balance secured by the trust deed." The 
result is that a conveyance by means of an install· 
ment land contract would essentially be precluded ir, 
all cases wherein the balance due on the truster· 
vendor's note was substantial if the "due-on" clause 
were to be given automatic effect. Accordingly, 
although the trustor-vendor might be willing to 
accept a rate of interest lower than that currently 
offered by institutional lenders, the prospective 
purchaser would be compelled to resort to such len· 
ders to finance the acquisition of the property. The 
result in terms of a restraint on alienation is 
clear. 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638, 526 P. 2d at 1174 
(citations omitted). 
It is significant to note that, although the 
California Supreme Court in the above case distinguished 
between restraints on alienation in contract sales and out· 
right sales, the same court subsequently held that the "due on 
sale" clause also constitutes a restraint on alienation in 
outright sales of property. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 
supra. 
The Arizona Supreme Court, describing language in a 
transaction which purported to exact an increase of 1/2% in 
interest rates and 1% transfer fee, classified the applicable 
clause as "a very harsh restraint on alienation." 
supra at 156. Query the description which the Patton court 
would have used for the substantially greater interest rate 
the Respondent desires in this c~se. 
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li'hile other courts have refused to hold that a "due 
on sale" clause constitutes a restraint on alienation (i.e., 
Occidental Sav. & Loan Assn' v. Venco Partnership, supra), the 
~ppellants urge that an examination of the affects of the "due 
on sale" clause on real property transactions in daily com-
merce demonstrate the "restraint" which such a clause imposes, 
for the reasons set forth in the above quote from Tucker v. 
Lassen, supra, as well as the practical restraints on the in-
ability of a person to take any actions involving his property 
without prior consent of a lender. The difficulties of in-
eluding a lender at all times in negotiations of terms of 
sale; inability to determine with any certainty whether a len-
der will or will not attempt to execise the "due on sale" 
clause; the continuing additional expenses and delays involved 
in obtaining lender approval; limitations on future ability to 
obtain financing; and problems of structuring the transactions 
for tax purposes. 
It is clear that under the common law of Utah, any 
conditions restraining the right to alienation of property, 
when repugnant to the interest created, are void. See Page v. 
Page, 394 P.2d 612 (Utah 1964). In the absence of a showing 
of jeopardy to the Respondent, the threat of acceleration is, 
in an actual and practical sense, the epitome of a restraint 
on alienation. Whether the restraint is reasonable is an 
issue of fact and the province of equity. 
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-The California Supreme Court, through a series of 
cases, has had considerable opportunity to examine the issues, 
principles of law and equi tv, and economic and oublic policv 
considerations in "due on sale" clauses. The series of 
California cases originated in a State having considerabl! 
commercial experience and background; the courts of that state 
have been faced with numerous issues involving the "due or: 
sale" clause; the law of California in this matter has evolved 
through careful consideration of a series of case and fact 
issues; the issues before this Court have been presented full\' 
to the California courts; and the cases have been vigorousl; 
disputed and litigated. 
One of the best-reasoned, and certainly one of the 
most-cited, cases on point is the Wellenkamo case. The 
California Supreme Court held that: 
a due-on clause contained in a promissory not' 
or deed of trust cannot be enforced upon the occur· 
rence of an outright sale unless the lender ca: 
demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessar 
to protect against impairment to its security or th' 
risk of default. 582 P.2d at 976-977 (citatior, 
omitted) 
In this case before this Court, the \ppellants, un 
like the situation in Wellenkamp, have not conveyed fee titl 
but, rather, retain an interest in the property until ful he 
payment is made. Hence, the Apoellants' case herein is eve at 
considerably stronger than ~ellenkamo. 
Since Wellenkamp articulates especially well ~ Fe 
Sa principles of equity governing the conflicting interests c 
lender and borrower, it is instructive to examine Wellenhami Ni 
Hi 
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rationale in some depth (this case going even beyond the facts 
iri the instant case): 
Defendant contends that the risk of waste and 
default is significant in an outright sale because 
both possession and legal title to the property are 
transferred, thereby eliminating any incentive or 
aoility that the seller/trustor would have to avoid 
realization of these risks by action of the buver. 
Although we have previously distinguished on this 
basis both the junior encumbrance, where neither pos-
session nor legal title was transferred (La Sala) and 
the installment land contract, where possession but 
not legal title was tranferred (Tucker), we are now 
convinced that, although the original borrower/seller 
no longer retains an interest in the property after 
transfer of legal title in an outright sale involving 
no secondary financing by the seller, this fact does 
not necessarily increase the risk to the lender that 
waste or default will occur. Thus the buyer in an 
outright sale, in order to pay off the seller's 
equity, may make a large down payment on the prop-
erty, thereby creating an equity interest in the 
property in him which is sufficient to provide an 
adequate incentive not to commit waste or permit the 
property to depreciate. Moreover, the buyer in such 
an outright sale may be at least as good, if not a 
better credit risk than the original borrower-
seller. We therefore conclude that although circum-
stances may arise in which the interest of the lender 
may justify the enforcement of a due-on clause in the 
event of an outright sale, the mere fact of sale is 
not in itself sufficient to warrant enforcement of 
the clause, and the restraint on alienation resulting 
therefrom, in the absence of a showing by the lender 
that such circumstances exist. 582 P. 2d at 975-76 
(citations omitted) (Emphasis added) 
Numerous other recent cases in various jurisdictions 
hold that no automatic right of acceleration exists in the 
absence of a showing that acceleration is justified to protect 
the legitimate interests of the lender, ~· Patton v. First 
Fed. sav. & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix, supra; Continental Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass' n v. Fetter, 564 P. 2d 1013 (Okla. 1977); 
1
1 Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra; Sanders v. 
Hicks, ~; Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, ~; 
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Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra; Home Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Palm Beach v. English, 249 So. 2d 701 
(Fla. App. 1971); Clark v. Lachemeier, suora. 
Perhaps the most direct example of the differences i 
the cases considering application on the "due on sale" clause 
is the comparison of the Wellenkamp rationale and reasonin 
with the decision in Occidental, supra, and strongly relied o 
The Occidental cas 
reasoning and hel 
by the Respondent in the lower court. 
refused to accept much of the Wellenkamp 
that a "due on sale" clause does not constitute an unreasonahl 
restraint on alienation and permitted acceleration of the not 
in that case. It is significant to note, however, in th 
Occidental case that: 
1. Even that court held "that a 'due on sale 
clause in an otherwise valid mortgage is enforceab~ 
absent pleading and proof by the mortgagor that sue 
enforcement would be inequitable" 943 N.W.2d at a: 
(Emphasis supplied). That court further acknowlenge 
that a "due on sale" clause "should be subject to tl 
same rules as other acceleration clauses, includir. 
the protection of equitable defenses" 293 N.W.2d a 
849. The Appellants in the instant case have bee 
precluded from offering such evidence. 
2. Occidental significantly justifies part r 
its reasoning by noting that the note and mortgage 
that case contained no prepayment penalty. 293 N.w.: 
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at 84 8. In the instant case, th@ ~ate contains a sub-
stantial prepayment penalty (R.33). 
3 · Occidental t:'ecognizes the court's continuing 
powers in this case to consider and fashion equitable 
defenses and relief. 293 N.W.2d at 849. 
4. It is informative to note that the Occidental 
case, unlike the instant case, arose in the context of 
(a) unimproved land which would require subsequent 
financing for construction of improvements thereon; 
and (b) the seller-mortgagor did not even appear to 
dispute foreclosure, and his default was entered. 293 
N.W.2d at 848. 
In holding that a "due on sale" clause does not con-
stitute a restraint on alienation, Occidental relied, to a con-
siderable degree, upon the definition contained in the Restate-
ment of Property and, therefore, did not go behind that defini-
tion to look at the practical affect of the "due on sale" lan-
guage. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Nichols v. Ann Arbor 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra, presented with the same argu-
ment, and after giving a practical and considered examination 
of that type of language, significantly stated: 
If the mortgage clause defendant seeks to en-
force can be labeled a restraint on alienation only 
by expanding the restatement definition, we do not 
hesitate to stretch the term to include this "due-
on-sale" clause. "[I]t would appear that the due-
on-sal clause is so closely akin to the promissory 
restra nt as to justify designating it a direct 
restra nt." 250 N.W. 2d at 806 (citation omitted). 
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It should be noted that Occidental contains an ;:ipPen 
dix to the majority opinion containing a valuable and thoroua 
summary of cases and articles on the subject of "due on sale 
clauses. 
ARGuMENT IV 
INCREASE OF INTEREST RATES ALONE IS NOT JUSTIFICATIO~ 
FOR ACCELERATION THROUGH THE "DUE ON SALE" CLAUSE 
The Respondent, as further justification for it 
-
attempted actions, made various arguments before the lowe: 
court regarding the commercial benefits to the lending insti 
tutions. One would think, by reading these arguments, tha· 
the Respondent is really not motivated by a desire to exac· 
extra profits at the expense of the borrowers. Rather, th' 
impression is that the primary motive for exacting additiona: 
interest rates is to benefit the borrowing public by settinc 
"fair and reasonable interest rates" and by preserving th; 
secondary mortgage market. While these issues are ultimatel: 
relevant to the trial court's considerations, the Appellant! 
suggest that the trial court should consider with healt~ 
scepticism these professed humanitarian motives and the fea: 
that the equitable decision will bring the mortgage lo~ 
industry to its knees. Indeed, no showing (or, indeed, alle· 
gation) has been made that financial chaos has fallen upon th' 
states who have rejected the Respondent's position. At th! 
very least, the Appellants are entitled to present this iss~ 
to the trial court, but they were denied this opportunity i: 
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this case. ~ithout belaboring this argument, it is sufficient 
to note that these arguments were rejected by the California 
Supreme Court in perceptive analysis in three cases: 
In any event, a restraint on alienation cannot 
be found reasonable merely because it is commercially 
beneficial to the restrainer. Otherwise one could 
justify any restraint on alienation upon the ground 
that the lender could exact a valuable consideration 
in return for its waiver, and that sensible lenders 
find such devices profitable. LaSala v. i\merican 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 881, 489 P.2d, 
1113, 1124, n. 17 (1971). 
We reject the suggestion that a lender's inter-
est in maintaining its portfolio at current interest 
rates justifies the restraint imposed by the exercise 
of a "due-on" clause upon the execution of an in-
stallment land contract. Whatever cogency this argu-
ment may retain concerning the relatively mild 
restraint involved in the case of an outright sale (a 
matter to which we do not now address ourselves), it 
lacks all force in the case of the serious and 
extreme restraint which would result from the auto-
matic enforcement of "due-on" clauses in the context 
of installment land contracts. Tucker v. Lassen Sav. 
& Loan .Z\.ss'n ,supra at 1775-1176, n. 10. (citations 
omitted) 
We furthermore reject Defendant's contention 
that the lender's interest in maintaining its loan 
portfolio at current interest rates justifies the 
restraint imposed by exercise of a due-on clause upon 
transfer of title in an outright sale. Although we 
recognize that lenders face increasing costs of doing 
business and must pay increasing amounts to deposi-
tors for the use of their funds in making long-term 
real estate loans as a result of inflation and a com-
petitive money market, we believe that exercise of 
the due-on clause to protect against this kind of 
business risk would not further the purpose for which 
the due-on clause was legitimately designed, namely 
to orotect aqainst impairment to the lender's secu-
rity that is shown to result from a transfer of 
title. Economic risks such as those caused by an 
inflationarv economy are among the general risks in-
herent in ~ every lending transaction. They are 
neither unforeseeable or unforeseen. Lenders who 
provide funds for longterm real estate loans should 
and do, as a matter of business necessity, take into 
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account their projections of future economic condi· 
tions when they initially determine the rate of pay. 
ment and the interest on these long-term loans. Un· 
fortunately, these projections occasionally prove tc 
be inaccurate. We believe, however, that it would~ 
unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaker 
economic projections on property owners exercisim 
their right to freely alienate their prooerty throuo~ 
the automatic enforcement of a due-on clause by th! 
lender. Wellenkamp, supra at 976 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added) 
ARGUMENT V 
APPLICATION OF LAWS OF UTAH AT ISSUE ARE 
NOT SUPERSEDED OR PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL REGULATION 
In an apparent attempt to avoid a head-on analysi! 
and application of Utah real property law, the Respondent 
argued in the lower court that the Respondent can nevertheles! 
accelerate the loan by virtue of the existence of a federal 
regulation allowing "due-on" language to be used in trust de~ 
by federal savings and loan associations (R.19-20) • With reai 
imagination, the Respondent (a state chartered savings anc 
loan) relied upon Sections 7-7-5.1 and 7-13-14, Utah Co~ 
Annotated ( 1953} , as amended, in an attempt to argue "pass 
through" of a federal regulation affecting federally charter~ 
savings and loans. The Court's Findings of Fact refer to this 
dispute but do not address the issue itself to clarify the 
interpretation, applicability or scope of these statutes. 
Rather, the lower court simply stated, without elaboration, 
that the Appellants have "misananalzed" the scope and nature 
of those statutes (R.113). 
The Respondent's reliance, in the lower court, on the 
issued of federal preemption, fails for at least five (5) rea· 
sons: 
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1. Determination of rights to real property has 
traditionally been left to the states. See La. Power 
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. s. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 583 
( 1968) . 
2. The Respondent, as a state-chartered savings 
and loan is subject to state regulations and inter-
pretation of its powers, including the interpretation 
of the scope and application of state statutory 
authority. 
3. It is the Utah Courts which interµret the 
scope of the Respondent's rights in real property and 
the intention of the legislature in passing the 
statutes relied upon (~ whether the Utah legisla-
ture intended to subordinate its regulation of state 
chartered financial institutions and real property 
law to all present and future regulations adopted by 
the federal bureaucracy) . 
4. The Respondent by contract agreed that the 
laws of Utah would govern the interpretation and 
application of the trust deed. 
5. Even if, ad arguendum, federal regulations 
are applicable to allow due-on-sale clauses in trust 
deeds, federal law does not determine or dictate the 
states' aoplication of laws affecting real oroperty. 
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The United States District Court for the Middle Dis 
trict of Florida, in the recent case of Kirkland v. l"idelit 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jacksonville (May 16, 1980), articu 
lated the appropriate relationship between the federal regula· 
tions and the state control of real property law in respons. 
to arguments of federal preemption, a stronger issue even tha· 
those arguments arised by the Respondent: 
Defendants argue that federal regulation ha• 
totally preempted the law in this case and that th' 
court must look solely to federal law and regulation• 
as it does, for example, in the area of labor law, 
Defendant's contention would be correct if Plaintif: 
were challenging the validity or interpretation o: 
the federal regulations. Further, if the state wer• 
attempting to place additional regulations on 
federally chartered savings and loan, it would b, 
precluded from doing so by federal oreemption .•. 
However, Plaintiffs in this case raise a· 
entirely different question. They do not challeng' 
the validity of the "due on sale" clause nor reque~ 
an interpretation of the federal regulation. 'Jar L 
this a case in which the state is attempting to regu· 
late the practices of a federal association. Plain· 
tiffs instead ask only for an interpretation of th: 
mortgage contract. They raise questions governed b 
contract and real property law. The law of rea: 
estate mortgage has not been totally oreemoted b· 
federal law even though the mortgage is issued by : 
federally chartered lending institution. In fact 
most mortgage foreclosures are appropriately brough: 
in state courts, and even when brought in federa: 
court generally are governed by state law. 
Even though federal law has not preempted th< 
entire field, in light of the almost verbatim adop· 
tion of the federal regulation as a EJrovision cf th: 
contract, it is possible that state law on this par· 
ticular point may have been preemcted bv implict 
tion. Though federal preemption may sometimes b: 
implied, the implication should oe accepted on~ 
where the intention is clearly manifest. This i: 
particularly true in the area of rights t:o real orop· 
erty which traditionally has been left to the states. 
- 32 -
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No such congressional, or even regulatory, in-
tent is manifest in this case. The regulation per-
mitting the clause in question was prompted by a 
desire to protect the federal association's interest 
in the propertv and should be construed with that in 
mind. Given the predominance of state law in the 
field of real property, this goal can only be reached 
oy construing the clause under the state law. The 
effect of a "wraparound" mortgage may vary from state 
to state. Therefore, its effect on the lender's in-
terest in the property may also vary among states. 
Thus, in one state the right to call a mortgage due 
upon exercise of a subsequent wrap-around mortgage 
may be necessary to protect the association's inter-
est in the property, while under the laws of another 
state the interests of the parties may be so defined 
as to make such a right unnecessary. Therefore, 
paragraph 17 will and should be construed differently 
under the laws of the various states. 
Further, the document itself reflects an under-
standing between the parties that the case be gov-
erned by state law. Paragraph 15 reads, "This mort-
gage shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the property is located." Even if this were 
not the case, the court would almost be forced to 
look to state law. There is no federal law governing 
the interjJretation of mortgages. Defendant's posi-
tion would require the court to fashion an entire 
body of federal law to govern real estate mortgages, 
which the court is unwilling to undertake without 
explicit congressional direction. The mere delega-
tion of rule-making authority does not constitute 
such direction. pp. 2-5 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added) 
ARGUMENT VI 
EVEN IF FORECLOSURE WERE PERMITTED, THE FORECLOSURE 
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
PERMITTING A REDEMPTION PERIOD 
By reliance upon ambigous language in the trust deed, 
the Respondent has attempted to require the entire principal 
balance under the loan payable, while, at the same time, pre-
cluding the normal six (6) month redemption period which nor-
mally would be involved under a mortgage for the orotection of 
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the borrower after the additional period of time required ti 
obtain a judgment permitting foreclosure. 
Under the Laws of Utah, the trust deed foreclosur; 
provides for the non-judicial foreclosure of property by thE 
lender, with the provision that the redemption period termi· 
nates after three (3) months from the initial recording of : 
notice of default. 57-1-28(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953), a: 
amended. On the other hand, a Court supervised mortgage fore· 
closure proceeding allows the lender a six (6) month redemp· 
tion period from and after the period of time required tc 
obtain a judgment of foreclosure. 78-37-8, Utah CodE 
Annotated (1953), as amended; Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The policy behind the two approaches is clear. n 
is presumed that the non-judicial trust deed foreclosure i: 
normally not as harsh a remedy, requiring a redemption period, 
because a borrower, in order to stop the proceedings, car 
simply tender the delinquent payments with the attendant 
costs, and reestablish the obligation in full force. 57-l-3L 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 1:\. mortgage, on th< 
other hand, allows a lender to require the entire principa: 
amount due and payable but, as a protection to the borrower, 
allows a six (6) month redemption period. 
The net effect of the Respondent's interpretation a~ 
application of the "due on sale" clause is to require th< 
entire principal amount to be due and payable, as in a mart· 
gage, but without the attendant protection to the borrower ~ 
the time for redemption. 
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Clearly, this Court has the power to interpret the 
nature and proceedings of real property transactions, and to 
apply the remedies, in an equitable manner for the protection 
of all parties. This Court, has on numerous occasions, recog-
nized various equitable powers of the court to construe real 
property transactions to prevent injustice to persons having 
interests in the real property. ~, Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 
P. 2d 233 (Utah 1978) (construction of Uniform Real Estate 
transactions as an equitable mortgage) ; Johnson v. Carman, 572 
P. 2d 3 71 (Utah 1977) (determination that forfeiture provision 
in contract was inequitable and unenforceable) ; Nagle v. Club 
Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346 (1965) (note allow-
ing forfeiture construed as a mortgage); Bybee v. Stuart, 112 
Utah 462, 189 P. 2d 118 (1948) (warranty deed construed as a 
security document). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Appellants 
urge that, at the very least, if foreclosure proceedings are 
permitted which require the complete payment of all accrued 
principal, such an action in effect constitutes a mortgage 
foreclosure action with the Appellants retaining their six (6) 
month redemption period after court order allowing foreclo-
sure. Any other aoproach would clearly be inequitable allow-
ing the lenders, as a result of a contract sale, transfer or 
encumorance, to circumvent the protection of the ~ortgage 
foreclosure laws, an action which clearly is contrary to 
public policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues raised by the Appellants involve substan 
tial issues of fact and law which affect a wide range of c~ 
mercial transactions within the State of Utah and should b' 
examined and determined by the Court to allow understandin· 
and certainty by the various parties involved. 
The lower court was in error in entering a Summar 
Judgment without consideration of these facts and legal issue' 
and should be reversed. 
Respectfully dbmitted, 
NE 
Attorney for Appellants 
I hereby 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ~,? · 
· /2 r, -::-!l ! 
certify that on the __}:__ day ::if ~
1980, I served two (2) copies of the attached Brief o' 
Appellants on Richard W. Giauque and James R. Holbrook, o'. 
Berman & Giauque, 500 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, UT 
84101, attorneys for Respondent, by hand delivering two (2 
copies thereof. 
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